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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States’ federalist constitutional system, the states still retain 
primary responsibility for the creation and enforcement of criminal law.1
States are said to have a general police power to act in this regard.2 By 
contrast, the U.S. Constitution only gives the federal government certain 
enumerated powers, which do not include a general police power.3 If the 
federal government wishes to regulate criminal behavior, it must tie any 
federal statutes punishing domestic crimes to one of Congress’s enumerated 
powers, such as the Commerce Clause.4 Increasingly, however, the United 
States has used its treaty-making power5 and its power to regulate foreign 
commerce to enter into international agreements that proscribe various kinds 
of criminal behavior, such as conventions on hijacking planes,6 fighting 
                                                                                                                     
* Cindy G. Buys, Professor of Law and Director of International Law Programs, 
Southern Illinois University School of Law. The author would like to thank the organizers 
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1 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 96 (1964), 
abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (“[T]he States still bear primary 
responsibility in this country for the administration of the criminal law . . . .”); see also
Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 293 n.186 (2011) (citing Murphy 
to explain the “historical state primacy in criminal law”).
2 See Chin, supra note 1, at 266 (discussing the states’ implied police power).
3 Congress does, however, have the power, “[t]o define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), Pub. L. 
No. 104–208, Div. A, Title I, § 101(f), 110 Stat. 3009–369, 3009–372 (1996) (amending 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, art. I, Dec. 16, 
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
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corruption,7 prohibiting the sale and prostitution of children,8 and engaging in 
terrorist activities.9 Much of this behavior is also a crime under various state 
laws and it is often state law enforcement authorities who are the front line 
personnel in identifying and arresting persons who could be charged with 
crimes under both U.S. and international law.10 As a result, state law 
enforcement is increasingly intersecting with international crimes.11
In addition to treaties proscribing criminal behavior, the United States 
belongs to a number of treaties that regulate the treatment of foreign 
defendants in U.S. custody, such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which provides for certain procedural rights, such as a right to 
a fair trial before an independent decision-maker.12 Other international 
agreements provide for cooperation with other countries’ law enforcement 
authorities in pursuing criminals across international boundaries.13 While most 
of this formal cooperation in fighting international crimes occurs at the federal 
level, the federal government often asks state and local law enforcement 
agencies to assist in these efforts in their local jurisdictions.14
Sometimes, states work harmoniously together with the federal 
government to carry out the United States’ treaty obligations; other times, 
states resist compliance with those international obligations because of 
conflicting state policies or objectives.15 Either way, states continue to retain 
significant relevance in the area of criminal law and the federal government 
would do well to consider states’ views when joining and implementing 
international treaties that pertain to criminal conduct if the federal government 
wants to ensure state cooperation.
                                                                                                                     
7 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 109–6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
8 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, art. I, adopted May 25, 2000, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 106–37, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227.
9 See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST 
TERRORISM, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 109-3, at 1, 2 (2005).
10 See Guide to Criminal Prosecutions in the United States, INFO. EXCHANGE
NETWORK FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CRIM. MATTERS & EXTRADITION, https://www.oas.org
/juridico/mla/en/usa/en_usa-int-desc-guide.html [https://perma.cc/PCS6-VNVP]
(explaining that states prosecute most crimes against persons and property).
11 See id.
12 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, art. 14, adopted 
Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
13 For example, pursuant to the Merida Initiative, the United States and Mexico share 
resources and information to combat cross-border criminal issues. See CLARE RIBANDO 
SEELKE & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41349, U.S.-MEXICAN SECURITY 
COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 9 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R41349.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3PE-QLFL]. 
14 See discussion infra Parts II and III (providing examples of international criminal 
cases in which the federal government asked for the assistance of state and local 
enforcement agencies).
15 See discussion infra Parts II and II (same).
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Two illustrative examples of international treaty obligations that 
frequently involve states in their enforcement are consular notification and 
extradition. The following parts describe the United States’ treaty obligations 
in these two areas and how states do or do not assist the federal government in 
the implementation of those obligations. This discussion also highlights the 
consequences when states and the federal government fail to work 
harmoniously together, both domestically and with respect to the impact on the 
United States’ foreign relations. Finally, the Article concludes with some 
suggestions as to why and how federal and state governments can work better 
together to ensure that U.S. treaty obligations are respected and criminals are 
held accountable for their actions.
II. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS
The duty to provide consular notification and access to foreign persons 
who are arrested and detained in the United States is a prime example of the 
continuing relevance of states in ensuring compliance with the United States’
international obligations in criminal matters. Consular notification and access 
has ancient roots.16 Today, the United States’ duty to provide consular 
notification and access derives primarily from Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR),17 as well as from approximately 
sixty bilateral consular treaties.18 Specifically, Article 36(1)(b) of VCCR 
requires that the competent authorities of a receiving state inform a foreign 
national who is arrested or detained in that state of his or her consular 
notification rights without delay.19 Further, if requested by a foreign national, 
the receiving state’s authorities shall, also without delay, notify the consular 
post of the sending state that the receiving state’s authorities have arrested or 
detained a national of the sending state.20 The purpose of consular notification 
                                                                                                                     
16 See United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Summary Records of 
Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the First and Second Committees, ¶¶ 55, 57–58, 
61, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.25/16 (Mar. 4, 1963) (providing statement on historical roots by 
President Stephan Verosta). For a description of the historical development of consular 
relations, see also Jaroslav Zourek (Special Rapporteur), Consular Intercourse and 
Immunities, [1957] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 71, 72–77, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/108 (Apr. 15, 
1957).
17 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36 (1), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 
596 U.N.T.S. 261 (ratified by the United States on Nov. 24, 1969) [hereinafter VCCR or 
Vienna Convention].
18 See U.S. Dept. of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bilateral Consular 
Conventions, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-
considerations/international-treaties-agreements/bilateral-consular-conventions.html
[https://perma.cc/SG4E-3EEX] (providing list of bilateral consular treaties).
19 VCCR, supra note 17, at art. 36(1)(b).
20 While the Vienna Convention requires consular notice only if requested by the 
foreign national, see VCCR, supra note 17, many of the bilateral treaties mandate consular 
notice of all arrests or detentions regardless of the wishes of the foreign defendant. See
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and access is to allow the consulate to provide assistance to its nationals, who 
may not speak English, understand the U.S. legal system, have access to legal 
counsel, or who may require other assistance.21
Litigation regarding the duty of consular notification under the VCCR 
exploded in many state and federal courts in the late 1990s.22 Foreign 
defendants arrested in the United States routinely were not being given 
consular notice and access by local and state law enforcement authorities.23
Foreign defendants sought a variety of remedies, including exclusion of 
evidence,24 dismissal of an indictment,25 and civil damages.26 The issue of 
lack of timely consular notification went to the U.S. Supreme Court on several 
occasions, most recently in the case of Medellin v. Texas.27
The issue of consular notification and access is illustrative of the both the 
possibilities and perils of state cooperation or lack of cooperation with U.S. 
treaty obligations and the Medellin case is a prime example.28 As is the case in 
most criminal matters, local law enforcement authorities arrested and charged 
Ernesto Medellin with rape and murder in Texas.29 Medellin was a national of 
Mexico but the arresting and detaining officers never notified Medellin of his 
right to contact the consulate or let the Mexican Consulate know that Texas 
police had arrested and charged one of their nationals.30 It was not until after 
conviction when the case was on appeal that the issue of the lack of consular 
notification came to light.31 The Texas courts took the position that it was too 
late to raise the issue on appeal and thus the issue was procedurally 
defaulted.32 Although Texas law enforcement officers had failed in their 
obligation to notify a foreign national whom they had arrested and detained of 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. Dept. of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, Countries and Jurisdictions with 
Mandatory Notifications, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
consularnotification/QuarantinNationals/countries-and-jurisdictions-with-mandatory-
notifications.html [https://perma.cc/6PQQ-AMTB] (providing list of such countries and 
jurisdictions).
21 Cindy Galway Buys et al., Do unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance 
with Consular Notification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 467–69, 471–72 
(2011).
22 Id. at 461.
23 See infra notes 24–26 (providing examples of cases in which defendants were not 
given consular notice).
24 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 340 (2006).
25 See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2001).
26 See Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 824, 835–36 (7th Cir. 2007).
27 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008) (determining whether 
international law and judgments are directly enforceable as domestic law); see also Breard 
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376–78 (1998) (holding that Vienna Convention claims are 
subject to procedural defaults).
28 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501. 
29 Id.
30 Id. at 500, 501.
31 Id. at 501.
32 See id. at 501–02.
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his right to consular notification and access, Texas refused to correct the 
wrong.33
Medellin attempted to have his murder conviction overturned on the basis 
of lack of consular notification and access, twice taking his case to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.34 Mexico also tried to enforce the VCCR by suing the United 
States at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on behalf of Medellin and 
fifty-one other Mexican nationals who also had been arrested, detained, and 
convicted of capital charges in various states in the United States without 
consular notice and access.35 Mexico does not use the death penalty and 
opposes its use on its citizens elsewhere.36 The United States did not deny that 
it had violated the VCCR by failing to provide consular notice and access in 
most of these cases, but argued that an apology to Mexico should be a 
sufficient remedy.37 The ICJ disagreed, finding in Case Concerning Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) that the proper remedy for 
the United States’ violation of its treaty obligations would be for the United 
States to provide, “by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration 
of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals.”38
Then U.S. President George W. Bush determined that the United States 
should discharge its international obligations under the ICJ’s decision in Avena
by having state courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general 
principles of comity.39 Accordingly, he issued a Presidential Memorandum 
addressed to the Attorney General containing this instruction.40 The Attorney 
General then forwarded that Memorandum to the affected states.41 While some 
states did comply,42 Texas flatly refused.43 In fact, the Governor and Attorney 
                                                                                                                     
33 See Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of 
Houston Teens, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/Medellin-executed-for-rape-murder-of-Houston-1770696.php
[https://perma.cc/RD47-BVAT].
34 The Supreme Court initially granted, then dismissed, Medellin’s first petition for 
certiorari due to the ongoing litigation in other forums. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 
662 (2005).
35 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 14 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena]. 
36 See, e.g., Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 
22, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1917, 27 May 2015; Gabriel Stargardter, Mexico 
Says Upcoming U.S. Execution of National Is ‘Illegal’, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-usa-deathpenalty/mexico-says-upcoming-u-s-
execution-of-national-is-illegal-idUSKBN1D62WP [https://perma.cc/3E78-H3LZ].
37 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at ¶ 120–21.
38 Id. at ¶ 153.
39 Memorandum for Attorney General from George W. Bush on Compliance with the 
Decision of the Int’l Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), https://www.state.gov/s/l/
2005/87181.htm [https://perma.cc/JY99-TK68] [hereinafter Bush Memorandum].
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3 (Nev. Sept. 19, 
2012) (illustrating Nevada’s compliance with the Bush Memorandum); Torres v. State, No. 
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General of Texas both rejected the idea that international law should trump the 
law of Texas, despite the Supremacy Clause to the U.S. Constitution making 
treaties the Supreme Law of the Land.44 When Medellin challenged Texas’
refusal to comply before the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court ruled that Texas’
criminal procedure laws prohibiting defendants from raising new claims on 
appeal prevailed over the obligation to comply with the VCCR, the decision of 
the ICJ, and the Presidential Memorandum.45 Texas proceeded with 
Medellin’s execution a short time after the Supreme Court’s judgment.46
Professor McGuiness has written about treaties such as the VCCR acting 
as a “norm portal” though which international norms, such as the right of 
consular notice and access, are incorporated into U.S. law.47 She is correct that 
U.S. law and practices at both the federal and state level have been changing in 
response to litigation over consular notice and access rights.48 There are 
significantly fewer cases involving claims of lack of consular notification 
today than there were ten years ago.49 This drop in litigation is likely due in 
part to the publicity surrounding the Supreme Court cases, which raised 
awareness of consular notification rights among both law enforcement and the 
bar. The drop also may result from greater education and outreach efforts by 
                                                                                                                     
PCD–04–442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (illustrating 
Oklahoma’s compliance with the Bush Memorandum).
43 See Mike Tolson & Rosanna Ruiz, Hearings Ordered for Death Row Mexican 
Nationals, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 9, 2005), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/
article/Hearings-ordered-for-death-row-Mexican-nationals-1668623.php
[https://perma.cc/FZ5R-GTVL]. 
44 Following the issuance of the ICJ’s decision in Avena, Governor Rick Perry’s
spokesman stated: “Obviously the governor respects the world court’s right to have an 
opinion, but the fact remains they have no standing and no jurisdiction in the state of 
Texas.” Polly Ross Hughes, Texas Unmoved by Ruling on Death Row Cases, HOUSTON 
CHRON. (Apr. 1, 2004), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Texas-unmoved
-by-ruling-on-death-row-cases-1985717.php [https://perma.cc/7T23-S3LV] (quoting 
Robert Black, spokesman for Gov. Rick Perry). Likewise, the Texas attorney general stated 
that: “The [S]tate of Texas believes no international court supersedes the laws of Texas or 
the laws of the United States.” Tolson & Ruiz, supra note 43 (quoting Greg Abbott, Texas 
attorney general).
45 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23, 530, 532 (2007).
46 See Turner & Ruiz, supra note 33.
47 See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal 
Integration of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 824, 828 (2006).
48 See infra note 49. 
49 Between 1998 and 2003, there were 166 federal cases involving claims under the 
VCCR. That number rose to 214 between 2003 and 2008 and remained essentially flat
immediately after the Supreme Court’s Medellin decision in the period between 2008 to 
2013, then fell to 123 between 2013 and 2018. Lexis Advance Search, LEXIS ADVANCE,
https://advance.lexis.com/firsttime?crid=4edc914f-8b22-488d-92d2-da6d13d6434c (search 
the phrase “Vienna Convention on Consular Relations” in all federal cases, except Tribal 
cases, between 1998 and August 2018).
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the federal government to state and local law enforcement.50 In addition, both 
states and the federal government have enacted new rules to better define and 
implement the duty of consular notification for arresting and detaining by law 
enforcement officers at the state and local level.51 For example, Illinois 
enacted a law in 2015 that specifies which law enforcement officer is required 
to give the consular notice and exactly when it must be given.52 It also requires 
that Illinois judges check to ensure consular notice and access has been 
provided to a defendant at the first appearance of that defendant in court.53
Similarly, Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was recently 
amended to provide that a foreign defendant be advised of his or her right of 
consular notification and access.54
Despite these changes, however, the incorporation of this international 
norm has been far from complete. States also have successfully pushed back 
against this norm incorporation, as is demonstrated by the Medellin case 
described above.55 There, Texas refused to review and reconsider Medellin’s
death sentence despite the ruling from the ICJ or the Presidential 
Memorandum from the Bush Administration directing Texas to give effect to 
the ICJ’s judgment.56 And when Texas’ refusal to comply was challenged 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, that Court ruled that Texas’s criminal 
procedure laws prohibiting defendants from raising new claims on appeal 
trumped the obligation to comply with the VCCR, the decision of the ICJ, and 
the Presidential Memorandum.57 The State of Texas’s refusal to comply with 
these international obligations put the United States in a very difficult position 
vis-à-vis its VCCR treaty partners.58 It has hurt U.S.-Mexican cooperation in 
fighting crime and the tension has not been resolved to this day.59
The Medellin saga illustrates that states still have quite a bit of relevance 
in determining whether the United States will comply with its international 
obligations, particularly in the area of criminal law. Because most arrests and 
                                                                                                                     
50 The U.S. Department of State provides educational training and resources relating 
to consular notification and access on its website here: A Brief Introduction to Consular 
Notification, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/consular
notification.html [https://perma.cc/D3ZP-3WHW] [hereinafter TRAVEL.STATE.GOV].
51 See infra notes 52–54.
52 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1 (2015).
53 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/109-1 (2015).
54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(F).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 28–46.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 35–46.
57 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23, 530, 532 (2008).
58 See Emily Stephenson, How Ted Cruz Win in Supreme Court Hurt U.S.-Mexico 
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detentions occur at a state or local level—not at the federal level60—
implementation of the right of consular notification and access, like other 
procedural rights, requires reliance on state and local law enforcement 
agencies. If the United States wishes to ensure compliance with its treaty 
obligations, and ensure reciprocal rights of consular notice and access for 
Americans arrested or detained abroad, it must do a better job of working with 
states to implement these treaty obligations.
III. EXTRADITION
Another area of criminal law where states may be called upon to assist in 
the implementation of international agreements is with respect to extradition 
treaties. Extradition is the process by which one country formally surrenders 
an individual to another country for prosecution and punishment.61 Extradition 
normally occurs pursuant to a treaty that sets forth the criteria for extradition.62
As of 2010, the United States was a party to bilateral extradition treaties with 
112 countries, in addition to several multilateral treaties.63
Most extradition treaties require that the offense for which extradition is 
sought be punishable as a serious crime in both the requesting and requested 
state.64 This requirement is known as “dual criminality.”65 United States’
policy favors interpreting treaties in favor of honoring extradition requests.66
Accordingly, the crime does not have to have exactly the same name in both 
states and the scope of liability does not have to be identical.67 “It is enough if 
the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.”68 Subject to some 
exceptions, crimes are generally defined by the “laws of the place where they 
are committed.”69 Thus, state criminal law will often determine whether 
particular conduct is a crime subject to extradition.
A foreign country that wishes to obtain custody of a person in the United 
States usually initiates the extradition process by submitting a request for 
                                                                                                                     
60 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251149,
PRISONERS IN 2016, 4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PWB9-QPWC] (comparing prisoners under jurisdiction of state and
federal correctional authorities).
61 See MICHAEL J. GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98–958,
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND RECENT 
TREATIES 1 (2010) [hereinafter CRS Report] (defining extradition and discussing 
extradition procedures).
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 35–42, app. A.
64 Id. at 9–10.
65 Jonathan O. Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual 
Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REV. 191, 191 (1992).
66 Id. at 203 (quoting Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298–300 (1933)).
67 CRS Report, supra note 61, at 10.
68 Id. (quoting Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922)).
69 Id. at 12.
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extradition to the U.S. Department of State.70 The Secretary of State has the 
discretion to decide whether to forward the request to the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ).71 Assuming the Secretary of State does so, the DOJ will 
examine the request for sufficiency and, if appropriate, forward the request to 
the district where the fugitive may be found.72 The Assistant U.S. Attorney in 
that district will obtain a warrant for the fugitive’s arrest.73 Once arrested, the 
fugitive will be brought before the magistrate judge or district court judge, 
who will schedule a hearing to determine if the fugitive is extraditable.74 If the 
fugitive is extraditable, the court will enter an order of extradition and certify 
the record to the U.S. Secretary of State, who will decide whether to surrender 
the fugitive to the requesting government.75
The extradition hearing is not a criminal trial and constitutional guarantees 
available to defendants in a criminal trial do not apply.76 Instead, the court in 
an extradition hearing is to determine whether:
(1) There exists a valid extradition treaty between the United States and the 
requesting state;
(2) The relator is the person sought;
(3) The offense charged is extraditable;
(4) The offense charged satisfies the requirement of double criminality;
(5) There is ‘probable cause’ to believe the realtor committed the offense charged;
(6) The documents required are presented in accordance with United States law, 
subject to any specific treaty requirements, translated and duly authenticated …; 
and
(7) Other treaty requirements and statutory procedures are followed.77
It is often the case that the persons who are sought for extradition are in 
state custody rather than federal custody.78 Thus, although the federal 
government is primarily responsible for the extradition process, the U.S. 
government often relies upon the cooperation of state governments to assist in 
carrying out extradition requests.
For example, in the case of In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia,79 police 
in Hodgkins, Illinois arrested and detained Nicolas Fulgencio Garcia on state 
                                                                                                                     
70 Id. at 19.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 20.
73 CRS Report, supra note 61, at 20.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 22–23.
77 Id. at 21 (citing In re Extradition of Valdez-Mainero, 3 F.Supp 2d 1112, 1114–15
(S.D. Cal. 1998)). 
78 See, e.g., In re Extradition of Fulgencio Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924 (N.D. Ill. 
2002) (discussing extradition of a Mexican foreign national while in state custody); In re
Extradition of Cheung, 968 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. Conn. 1997) (discussing extradition of a 
Hong Kong foreign national while in state custody).
79 In re Fulgencio Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
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law charges.80 While in state custody, the authorities learned of an outstanding 
warrant for his arrest in Mexico for the crimes of injury and homicide against 
his wife.81 Mexico submitted a formal request for extradition pursuant to the 
1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty.82 Garcia was transferred from state 
custody into federal custody and an extradition hearing was held.83 The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that there was 
sufficient evidence for both crimes to create probable cause to extradite Garcia 
to Mexico.84
The United States government also sought the assistance of a state in 
carrying out an extradition request by the United Kingdom on behalf of Hong 
Kong in the case of In re Extradition of Cheung.85 There, Hong Kong sought 
the defendant, John Cheung, in connection with thirty-three counts of financial 
deception and theft in Hong Kong.86 Because the United States and Hong 
Kong do not have an extradition treaty directly between them, the United 
Kingdom made the request on behalf of Hong Kong, which the U.S. district 
court found to be proper.87 U.S. Magistrate Judge Margolis issued a warrant 
for Cheung’s arrest pursuant to a U.S. statute authorizing such action when a 
person who is the subject of an extradition request is found within the court’s
jurisdiction.88 Cheung was arrested in December 1996 and held at a state 
facility, the New Haven Correctional Facility in Connecticut, while the 
extradition hearing was conducted.89 Ultimately, the magistrate judge found 
the terms of the extradition treaty to be met and ordered Cheung’s extradition 
to Hong Kong to answer the charges there.90 Thus, once again, the United 
States government relied on local law enforcement to assist in carrying out 
obligations under an extradition treaty.
On the other side of the coin, the United States may be the requesting state 
seeking extradition of a fugitive who committed a crime in the United States, 
but the fugitive fled the country before being prosecuted, convicted, and 
punished.91 One famous example is the case of Jens Soering, a German 
national living in the United States, who was accused of killing his girlfriend’s
parents in Virginia.92 After the murder, Soering and his girlfriend fled to the 
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United Kingdom, where they came to the attention of the U.K. authorities 
when they were caught attempting to pass a fraudulent check.93
The United States requested that the United Kingdom extradite Soering 
back to the United States to stand trial for murder in Virginia pursuant to a 
bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and the United 
Kingdom.94 Germany intervened and requested that the United Kingdom 
refuse the request because Germany opposed the death penalty, which was 
likely to be sought in Soering’s case.95 Germany claimed that imposition of 
the death penalty on one of its nationals would violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to which the United 
Kingdom belonged.96
In response, the United Kingdom asked for an assurance from the United 
States that the death penalty would not be sought.97 The United States 
explained that it was not the proper entity to make that decision because the 
State of Virginia was prosecuting Soering under state law, but agreed to make 
the request of the State of Virginia, where the murder occurred and the trial 
would take place.98 The Commonwealth attorney of Bedford County, Virginia 
refused to give the requested assurance, stating only that he would make the 
court/jury aware of the views of the United Kingdom and Germany.99 The 
dispute went to the European Court of Human Rights, which held that the 
United Kingdom would violate its obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if it extradited Soering to the 
United States due to the “death penalty phenomenon” that existed in the 
United States.100 The European Court of Human Rights determined that this 
phenomenon constituted cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention.101 Facing the prospect of 
not being able to try Soering for the murders, the Virginia prosecutor 
ultimately relented and agreed not to seek the death penalty.102 The United
Kingdom then extradited Soering to the United States to stand trial, where he 
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.103 The Soering case is 
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another example of state reluctance to comply with international law, but this 
time, the state had to relent to obtain the international cooperation it sought.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF STATE BEHAVIOR
When states work harmoniously with the federal government to carry out 
U.S. treaty obligations, the system can work as intended to bring criminals to 
justice in the appropriate or agreed upon forum. However, when states resist 
compliance with U.S. treaty obligations, the consequences for U.S. foreign 
relations can be severe. Foreign countries may not be willing to enter into 
treaties with the United States if the United States cannot guarantee that those 
treaty commitments will be respected. In addition, the United States may be 
unable to obtain extradition of fugitives abroad who committed crimes in the 
United States if the United States cannot carry out its extradition promises to 
its treaty partners when foreign fugitives are found in the United States.
Further, treaty partners may be unwilling to accord certain rights guaranteed 
by these treaties to U.S. citizens who may be arrested or detained abroad, such 
as consular notification and access and other due process guarantees, if the 
United States does not provide those rights to foreigners in the United States.
Consequently, it is imperative that the U.S. government create positive 
working relationships with state and local law enforcement to ensure that these 
international treaty obligations relating to the criminal process work smoothly 
and as intended. This obligation should begin by consulting states when 
treaties are being negotiated so that state officers understand what obligations 
are being undertaken and why. This early consultation would allow states to 
raise any objections, potential conflicts with state laws, or procedural 
difficulties that may exist at a time when those problems may still be 
addressed in the treaty negotiations. Once a treaty is finalized, further federal-
state consultations should take place to educate state officials about the 
treaty’s terms and the state’s potential role in assisting the United States to 
comply with its treaty obligations.
Post-adoption federal-state consultation is expressly provided for in some 
trade treaties such as the World Trade Organization Agreement and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, so there is precedent for and some 
experience with the process.104 However, more and better consultation prior to 
treaty conclusion would also be helpful in eliminating potential problems and 
ensuring state cooperation. Engaging in such an ongoing consultation process 
also would demonstrate respect for our federalist system of government, which 
continues to recognize the traditional police powers of the states.
Once a treaty is ratified, the federal government must engage in an 
extensive educational campaign, in which it provides information and training 
to state and local law enforcement officers so they understand their role and 
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how to carry it out. For example, in the context of consular notification and 
access, the U.S. State Department maintains a website with extensive materials 
that are available to state and local police officers about how and when to give 
consular notice, consular notice statements in several foreign languages, a 
consular notice pocket card, contact information for the various foreign 
consulates, and other relevant information.105 In addition, the U.S. State 
Department conducts training sessions for state and local law enforcement 
officers around the country to ensure their understanding and compliance.
While compliance remains far from perfect, improvements are being seen.
V. CONCLUSION
For many decades, the federal government has been increasing the scope 
of its authority and sphere of action and, some would argue, intruding on the 
reserved power of the states under the Tenth Amendment. One way the U.S. 
government has done so is through the use of the treaty power.106 Ever since 
Missouri v. Holland in 1920, it has been accepted that the federal government 
may use its treaty power to regulate in areas traditionally reserved to the states, 
as long as the subject of the treaty is of international concern and no other U.S. 
Constitutional provisions are violated.107 As persons, goods, and money 
increasingly move across international boundaries, crime must be addressed at 
the international level to be effective, despite the traditional view that criminal 
behavior is for state regulation. Accordingly, the U.S. government has entered 
into dozens of treaties that address crime and criminal procedure. As has been 
shown herein, however, such treaties will only be effective in the U.S. 
federalist system if the federal government works closely with state and local 
law enforcement agencies to carry out those international obligations.
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